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The Difference that Religion Makes: 
Transplanting Legal Ideas from the West to Japan and India 
 
Abstract 
What is the fate of legal transplants when they arrive from one culture, the Western culture, 
which is religious, to another culture that has no religion? Using the theoretical framework of 
legal transplantation developed by Masaji Chiba and the theory of religion developed by S.N. 
Balagangadhara the problem is tested with two different types of indigenous law, drawn from 
cultures - Japan and India. Dysfunctional effects result when certain kinds of legal ideas, 
embedded as norms within the Western culture, which is constituted by a religion, Christianity, 
are transplanted into those non-Western cultures that do not have religion. Religion and the ideas 
linked to it (such as the freedom of religion and the separation of religion and state) break down, 
and become distorted, absurd or nonsensical, and potentially conflict-inducing when placed in a 
culture without religion. This occurs as the secular state engages in the process of suppressing 
what it implicitly regards as false religion or idolatrous practices existing within the indigenous 
culture of a people. As Chiba foresaw, this process can even lead to the identity postulate of a 
legal culture being altered or destroyed.  
 
Introduction 
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Masaji Chiba’s contributions to the study of law are vital.1 He was a strong Asian voice amidst 
the hubristic cacophony created by Western legal theorists, which has been crowding out other 
voices in the world. His insights are largely overlooked by Western legal scholars and this 
continues to be the case even within studies connected to the field of legal pluralism to which he 
contributed the most among Asian scholars.2 This may be because he often saw through the 
problems and deficiencies inherent to “Western model jurisprudence” which was parasitically 
adopted by non-Western scholars and countries, and he was not afraid to say so openly, or as he 
would say, “frankly”!3 This overlooking is to the detriment of legal scholarship generally. My 
own experience is that one can go back repeatedly to Chiba’s works to discover previously 
unnoticed insights.  
Werner Menski first introduced me to Chiba’s work, and I began to take a deeper look at what 
Chiba was writing in connection with my work on cultural diversity and legal pluralism in the 
British context.4 At the time, I was not yet preoccupied by the question of religion to the extent I 
subsequently came to be. Eventually, perhaps, the 9/11 effect took hold of me too! I received a 
                                                             
1  This article emerges from a presentation originally made by the writer at the Chiba Memorial Symposium: 
Towards a General Theory of Legal Culture in a Global Context, at the School of Law, SOAS, University of London 
26 March 2012. 
2 For example, see the absence of reference to Chiba’s work in Martha-Marie Kleinhans & Roderick A. Macdonald, 
“What is a Critical Legal Pluralism?” (1997) 12 Canadian Journal of Law & Society 25; Franz von Benda-
Beckman, “Who’s Afraid of Legal Pluralism?” (2002) 47 Journal of Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law 37; and 
Brian Z. Tamanaha (2007): “Understanding Legal Pluralism: Past to Present, Local to Global” (2007) 29 Sydney 
Law Review 375; and the dismissive way in which Chiba’s work is treated by Emmanuel Melissaris, Ubiquitous 
Law: Legal Theory and the Space for Legal Pluralism (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2009).  
3 Chiba’s critique of ‘legal culture’, in prevalent use among Western scholars, and infected by their preoccupation 
with state law, is one example. See Masaji Chiba, “Japan” in Poh-Ling Tan, ed, Asian Legal Systems: Law, Society 
and Pluralism in East Asia (Sydney et al: Butterworths, 1997) at 83-86; Masaji Chiba, “Other Phases of Legal 
Pluralism in the Contemporary World” (1998) 11 Ratio Juris 228. 
4 ??. 
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Chiba Grant (‘Beca Chiba’) to study at the International Institute for the Sociology of Law at 
Oñati, Spain in 2005, specifically on the question of religious reconstruction among Britain’s 
South Asian diasporas.5 Probably, Chiba had presciently realized that studies of non-Western law 
would be neglected in Western legal circles and made sure that the grant he had endowed was 
dedicated to that potentially enormous field of research.6 Meanwhile, the bombings in London of 
7/7 took place just a few days before my wife and I arrived in Oñati. This was the start of a 
concern with religion and law which is still with me and which I now attempt to take beyond the 
British context. 
In his English language writing, Chiba does not elaborate about his idea of religion and he 
certainly does not try to lay out some kind of theory of religion. Rather, he is interested 
throughout his work to elaborate on and refine meta-level concepts in order to delineate the chief 
characteristics of legal pluralism, especially legal rules, legal and identity postulates, official and 
unofficial law, indigenous and transplanted law, trans-state law, and so on. How, then, does 
Chiba use the term ‘religion’? Religion features as one aspect of legal pluralism in the theory set 
out by Chiba and, for him, it belongs under the general rubric of ‘legal postulates’.7 Legal 
postulates inform official and unofficial laws by founding, justifying or orienting them and legal 
postulates are not exhausted by religion. Chiba’s choice of the term ‘legal postulates’ seems to 
have been motivated partly by the fact that he figured out that the term ‘natural law’ was too 
                                                             
5 For the outcomes of that research, see ??.  
6 Evidently, the Masters programme at Oñati has not been able to maintain a broad enough syllabus to ensure a 
sustained focus on non-Western laws. 
7 Masaji Chiba, ed, Asian Indigenous Law in Interaction with Received Law (London & New York: KPI, 1986) at 6-
7. 
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identified with Western culture to be of use as a meta-level idea in a multicultural world.8 This 
was an interesting move by Chiba, in itself worthy of notice, in that it represents an instance of 
his attempts to specify the limit of concepts derived from one particular culture and to go beyond 
the Western concepts which were (and are) tying down legal theory within its Eurocentric 
cocoon.9 
As a feature of Japanese culture Chiba regarded Shinto as a religion, describing it as “originally 
an indigenous folk religion”, which was subsequently “ideologized as the State Shinto”.10 He 
saw Hindu law as a “religious law”.11 These observations are hardly exceptional to Chiba since 
the conventional wisdom in today’s world is that Shinto is a type of religion, and so is Hinduism. 
It is still strange in most circles for people to say that neither Hinduism nor Shinto are religions; 
or that neither is even a coherent unit of discourse as generally implied by their portrayal as 
kinds of religious entities. Yet, these are precisely the sorts of claims that are made in this article, 
which will open up the possibility of asking further questions about Asian legal systems. 
It is well known in some circles that a lively debate has been raging about the possibility or 
impossibility of legal transplants and the bearing that culture or the nature of societies has on the 
success or quality of legal transplantation. The protagonists in this debate have been Alan 
Watson and Pierre Legrand.12 Not untypically, Chiba’s investigations into the problem were 
                                                             
8  Masaji Chiba, Legal Pluralism: Toward a General Theory through Japanese Legal Culture (Tokyo: Tokai 
University Press, 1989) at 134-8.  
9 Chiba, ibid, similarly distanced himself from other concepts such as ‘customary law’ and ‘positive law’ because he 
found them too linked to the Western culture. For a deeper discussion of the specificity of Western jurisprudence, 
which Western scholars have hardly taken note of, see ibid at 27-56.  
10 Ibid at 92.  
11 Chiba, Asian Indigenous Law, supra note 7 at 385.  
12 Alan Watson, Legal Transplants: An Approach to Comparative Law, 2nd ed (Athens & London: The University 
of Georgia Press, 1993); Alan Watson, “Legal Transplants and European Private Law” (2000) 4 Electronic Journal 
Page 4 of 26
Asian Journal of Comparative Law
Asian Journal of Comparative Law
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Review Only
5 
 
ignored by them. Chiba advised us to look deeper at the dynamics of transplanted law, which he 
defined as that law “which was received from foreign cultures or imposed by foreign 
countries”.13 He advised that we should look at the whole working structure of a socio-legal 
entity from a historical viewpoint and should pay attention to its identity postulate in order to 
assess the fate of any transplantation. As Chiba noted:  
the whole process and outcome must be viewed with the total history of the people 
concerned – a history in which they have endeavoured to preserve their cultural identity 
in law against other peoples. Here, then, is hypothesized one or more basic legal 
postulates of a country functioning throughout its history to provide the people with the 
criteria with which they are enabled to determine, from among many possibilities, what 
kinds of law they should develop selectively and … what foreign law and to what extent 
it should be received or rejected in order to preserve their cultural identity in terms of 
law. Such a postulate or postulates cannot be of a received nature insofar as each group of 
people concerned has preserved its national identity in history, but must be of an 
indigenous nature, however it or they may have involved or assimilated received law. 
The “identity postulate of indigenous law” may thus be an appropriate name for such a 
postulate or postulates.14  
Chiba saw that there were different identity postulates in different countries; Dharma in India, 
Shinto in Japan, and Islam in Iran or Egypt which do the work of selecting what transplanted 
laws are chosen and the way in which they function. Therefore, the reception of transplanted law 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
of Comparative Law http://www.ejcl.org/ejcl/44/44-2.html; Pierre Legrand, “The Impossibility of Legal 
Transplants” (1997) 4 Maastricht Journal of European & Comparative Law 111. 
13 Chiba, “Other Phases”, supra note 3 at 241.  
14 Chiba, Asian Indigenous Law, supra note 7 at 390.  
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should tell us something about the nature of the identity postulate of any socio-legal entity and 
may also allow us to propose further hypotheses about the fate of transplanted laws. Chiba 
revised the description of the ‘identity postulate’ to account for legal change over time and for 
different foreign influences and he therefore renamed it the “identity postulate of a legal culture” 
so that the term may signify a combination of indigenous and transplanted factors.15 He drew 
attention to the possibility of competition and struggle as well as a change in an identity 
postulate, as a result of negligible, transformative or destructive influences. This article points to 
just such a potential for change within socio-legal entities, albeit with as yet inconclusive results. 
The question here is: what is the fate of legal transplants when those transplants arrive from one 
culture, the Western culture, which is religious, to another culture that has no religion? To test 
the fate of received law, I take two different types of indigenous law, drawn from cultures whose 
identity postulates are derived from non-Semitic or ‘pagan’ elements - Japan and India. In both 
cases we try to discover what occurs when religion and ideas linked to it are transplanted from 
the Western culture. The more specific claim here is that dysfunctional effects result when 
certain kinds of legal ideas, embedded as norms within the Western culture, which is constituted 
by a religion, Christianity, are transplanted into those non-Western cultures that do not have 
religion. I want to specifically discuss the fate of ideas linked religion such as the freedom of 
religion and the separation of religion and state, as enacted within the legal orders of non-
Western countries. The further claim here is that these break down, get distorted, become absurd 
or nonsensical, and even potentially conflict-inducing when placed in a culture where the identity 
postulates are not religious. As Chiba foresaw, this process can even lead to the identity postulate 
of a legal culture being altered or destroyed. This occurs as the secular state engages in the 
                                                             
15 Chiba, Legal Pluralism, supra note 8 at 166-9.  
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process of suppressing what it implicitly regards as false religion or idolatrous practices existing 
within the indigenous culture of the people. 
 
Religion 
A number of researchers have argued that that the type of religion presupposed by studies of 
comparative religion and the social sciences more generally is Christianity, or they have voiced 
doubts about the validity of the claim that religion is a property of all cultures.16 The strongest 
challenge against the claim of universality of religion has been mounted by S.N. Balagangadhara 
and his seminal research programme on the Comparative Science of Cultures. 17 
Balagangadhara’s work has attracted some critical acclaim among scholars although it must be 
said, at the same time, that those Western scholars with whom I have had discussions are not 
willing to engage properly with his work, which is to the general detriment of various fields in 
the human sciences, including law.18 Even though law and religion studies have attracted much 
research funding in recent years we find no serious attention to Balagangadhara’s work in that 
connection.19  
                                                             
16 See, for example, the discussion and authors cited by Markus Dressler & Arvind Mandair, eds, Secularism and 
Religion-Making (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011) at 16-18.  
17 See, especially, S. N. Balagangadhara, "The Heathen in his Blindness…”: Asia, the West, and the Dynamic of 
Religion (Leiden, New York: E. J. Brill, 1994; 2nd rev. ed, New Delhi, Manohar, 2005; reference here is to the 1st 
ed). For an abridged version, see S. N. Balagangadhara, Do All Roads Lead to Jerusalem? The Making of Indian 
Religions (New Delhi: Manohar, 2014).  
18 See the set of review essays on Balagangadhara, The Heathen, ibid, in the special issue (1996) 8(2) Cultural 
Dynamics. In experience and research so far, most writers who otherwise comment on the book tend to undermine 
its claims by misrepresenting them.  
19 Ten Chin Liew, “Secularism and its Limits” in Michael S. H. Heng & Ten Chin Liew (eds), State and Secularism: 
Perspectives from Asia (Singapore: World Scientific Publishing, 2010) 7 raises expectations by referring to one 
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Balagangadhara draws attention to an often encountered inconsistency involved when the criteria 
indispensible to describing the Semitic religions - God, holy books, founders, doctrines etc. - are 
the very ones dispensed with when applied to other traditions while claiming they are religions 
too. He shows by reference to Christian sources (but which is shared by Islam and Judaism) that 
the claim of religion being a universal despite this inconsistency can be put down to theology. 
Balagangadhara shows that this pre-theoretical and empirically untested theological assumption 
has subsequently seeped into the social sciences in secularized form. That is why the social 
sciences today also claim that all cultures have religion. Taking the point further, with reference 
to historical evidence, he shows also how Europeans when travelling to Asia and other lands 
‘discovered’ religion because it was a presupposed property of other cultures, and how they 
brought unrelated phenomena together under the rubric of various ‘religions’. We will return to 
this point.  
Balagangadhara also offers a hypothesis of religion. He does not assert the existence of religion 
as a matter of mere language or discourse as other writers who build, for instance, on 
Wittgenstein or Foucault have done.20 Neither is Balagangadhara after a definition of religion. 
Rather, he wants to examine religion as a phenomenon in the world and draws out its properties 
by proposing a hypothesis of religion.21  Balagangadhara does not, however, argue that language 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
article by Balagangadhara and De Roover but is unable to pursue its consequences and writes in ignorance of the 
research programme.  
20 A notable figure here is Talal Asad, Genealogies of Religion: Discipline and Reasons of Power in Christianity 
and Islam (Baltimore, Maryland: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993). 
21 Thus Balagangadhara’s task is quite different to, for example, Prasenjit Duara, “An East Asian Perspective on 
Religion and Secularism” in Michael S. H. Heng & Ten Chin Liew (eds), State and Secularism: Perspectives from 
Asia (Singapore: World Ten Chin Liew Scientific Publishing, 2010) 1 at 2 where he says: “It is obviously 
meaningless to talk about whether or not religion existed in history; it has everything to do with how one defines the 
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use must not be taken seriously. It should, but it can provide us with a picture only of some 
conventional understanding, which may not be universal, but particular to a culture. He narrows 
down the search by examining the terms under which Judaism, Christianity and Islam recognize 
themselves and others as religions.22 These terms are as follows: (a) rivalry with respect to 
doctrinal aspects including in relation to the nature and existence of God; (b) that beliefs 
determine the difference between individuals and between communities; (c) because the actions 
of the faithful are embodiments of such beliefs, the different practices of individuals – to the 
extent these are relevant to religious practices – are expressions of competing religious beliefs; 
(d) consequently, that conversion from one religion to another means a rejection of one set of 
beliefs and practices and embracing another set on grounds of truth and falsity, it being vital and 
necessary that believers believe in the truth of their beliefs. Using this ‘Semitic concept of 
religion’, Balagangadhara is able to explain, in a single hypothesis, why, on the one hand, 
Judaism, Christianity and Islam recognized themselves, each other, and certain others as 
religions under particular terms of description and, on the other hand, why the pagan traditions of 
Rome and India did not recognize themselves and the others (Judaism, Christianity and Islam) 
under these terms of description. That is why the followers of these traditions could only respond 
with indifference and incomprehension to the characterization of religious rivalry.  
While Judaism, Christianity and Islam may be exemplary instances of religion, Balagangadhara 
proposes that religion itself, which all three share, is an “explanatory intelligible account of both 
the Cosmos and of itself”.23 This account says that the cause of the Cosmos eiais the Will of 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
term.” Definitional exercises will have limited consequences in terms of generating knowledge about a phenomenon 
where theory building is required.  
22 Balagangadhara, The Heathen, supra note 17 at 295-6.  
23 Ibid at 298-318.  
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God, and all that was, is and will be is an expression of His Will. God’s intentions can be known 
by studying the Cosmos and His revelation. This kind of account fuses God’s intentions or 
reasons for acting and the causes of His actions into a single explanation; He is the perfect being 
whose reasons can be read off his actions, which are His creation and the revelation He sent. A 
religious person thus experiences the Cosmos as both a causally explainable and an intelligible 
entity, a way of structuring the experience of the world that is not available to those without 
religion. Life is part of a bigger plan, and human life and death have a meaning and purpose, 
making it possible to ask questions about that meaning and purpose, answers to which are to be 
discovered. Within a religion, faith distinguishes a truly religious person from one who merely 
accepts that God is a creator of the Cosmos and follows its ethical rules. Faith allows the making 
of a distinction between those who adhere and do not adhere to religious truth (there can only be 
one truth), and to have faith is the other side of the coin to being intolerant, since a believer 
cannot accept that other religions are ‘equally true’. As Balagangadhara notes, “Intolerance, then, 
is necessary to being a religious person.”24 
That people from cultures which have religion also have a cognitive compulsion to ‘find’ 
religion in other cultures was also sensed by Staal, who observed that:  
The inapplicability of Western notions of religion to the traditions of Asia… is also 
responsible for something more extraordinary: the creation of so-called religions. This 
act was primarily engaged in by outsiders and foreigners, but is sometimes subsequently 
accepted by members of a tradition. The reasons lie in the nature of Western religion …In 
most parts of Asia, such religions do not exist, but scholars, laymen and Western converts 
persist in searching for them. If they cannot find them, they seize upon labels used for 
                                                             
24 Ibid at 312. 
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indigenous categories, rent them from their original context and use them for subsequent 
identification of what is now called a “religious” tradition. Thus there arises a host of 
religions: Vedic, Brahmanical, Hindu, Buddhist, Bon-po, Tantric, Taoist, Confucian, 
Shinto, etc. In Asia such groupings are not only uninteresting and uninformative, but 
tinged with the unreal.25  
First of all, Staal’s claim about the inapplicability of Western notions of religion to Asian 
traditions (by “Western” Staal refers to all three Semitic religions) seem analogous to Jun’ichi 
Isomae’s reference to Seki Kazutoshi and Ama Toshimaro who, says Isomae “agreed that the 
Western concept of religion was not suited to the analysis of non-Western religious 
phenomena”.26 In effect, both say that we require a more extended concept of religion that fits 
Asian religious phenomena.27 At this point, the usefulness of Balagangadhara’s theory becomes 
more evident. Balagangadhara’s own evidence shows how the terms of description of the Semitic 
religions were incomprehensible to followers of the Roman pagan and Indian traditions. Rather 
than arguing for the stretching of the concept of religion to fit Asian realities, which he already 
identifies as having been routinely done to account for Asian phenomena, and which he shows as 
resulting in contradictory ideas of religion, he accounts for why the Semitic concept of religion 
makes no sense to those from Asian cultures. It makes no sense because they lack an explanatory 
intelligible account; ergo they lack religion. His theory therefore explains why the doctrinal 
rivalry inherent to the Semitic religions is incomprehensible to Asians and why they are 
indifferent to it. Rather than explaining that Japanese beliefs “in the workings of unseen 
                                                             
25 Frits Staal, Rules without Meaning: Ritual, Mantras and the Human Sciences (New York: Peter Lang, 1989) at 
393.  
26 Isomae Jun’ichi, Religious Discourse in Modern Japan: religion, State, and Shintō (Leiden: Brill, 2014) 19.  
27 Staal, supra note 25 actually holds other inconsistent positions that would inter alia restrict the term ‘religion’ to 
the Western monotheisms. See for a critique Balagangadhara, The Heathen, supra 17 note at 282-7.  
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presences” are evidence of a form of religiosity, Isomae would have been better off adopting 
Balagangadhara’s better explanation for Isomae’s own observation that: “So, because Japanese 
are uncomfortable in using the word ‘religion’, with its connotations connected to Christianity, 
they often want to assert that they do not want to believe in ‘a religion,’ and end up expressing 
the difference by saying ‘Japanese are not religious.’”28 
Staal also noticed that there was something ‘unreal’ about the groupings constructed by outsiders 
and foreigners. Balagangadhara explains the status of these ‘creations’ in the following way: 
the West did two things: (a) created ‘Hinduism’ and ‘Buddhism’ etc. as coherent and 
structured units and (b) did so as religions. The issue is not whether western culture 
created a monolithic religion instead of recognizing the multiplicity of theories and 
practices that go under the label ‘Hinduism’. It is not even whether they experienced 
‘Hinduism’ as a monolithic entity. Instead, it lies in the fact that ‘Hinduism’, as a concept 
and as an experiential entity, provided the westerners with a coherent experience. To the 
extent it is a concept, it is a human construct, like all other concepts. It is also a construct 
because, as an experiential entity, it unifies the western experience. However, this 
concept has no reference in the world, i.e., there is no ‘Hinduism’ (whether as a religion, 
or as a multiplicity of religions) in the Indian culture.29 
Balagangadhara explains further the ontological status of the “experiential entity” that is 
Hinduism:  
                                                             
28 Isomae, Religious Discourse supra note 26 at xiv.  
29 S.N. Balagangadhara, “Orientalism, Postcolonialism and the ‘Construction’ of Religion” in E. Bloch, M. Keppens 
& R. Hegde, eds, Rethinking Religion in India: The Colonial Construction of Hinduism (London, Routledge, 2010) 
135 at 138.  
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In his Orientalism, Said distinguishes between the Orient as a place and ‘the Orient’ as an 
entity that exists only in the western experience. Similarly, one could argue that 
‘Hinduism’ is both a false description of Indian reality and it is an imaginary entity. It is 
false not because the West gave a false description of some reality (‘Hinduism’ in this 
case) but because they falsely assumed that their experiential entity was also a real entity 
in the world. It is imaginary in the sense that it does not have an existence outside the 
experience of western culture.30 
Balagangadhara writes that, in the process of making an entity like Hinduism (or Shinto, for that 
matter), tradition is cast as another religion, and provided with a ‘foundation’ which inscribes its 
falsity.31 The otherness of the traditions, based as they are upon ancestral practices and human 
knowledge, thus disappears in this account: “Having no ‘other’, religion merely postulates other 
religions. It is impossible that India does not have religion; it merely has another religion.”32 
Perhaps we should speak about this process as ‘anothering’. When religions were found, they 
were opposed to whichever idea of truth Europeans had brought with them and invariably 
described by them to be false religions. It followed that the practices of the natives identified as 
regressive, being inconsistent with the ethical values of the Europeans, should be reformed. This 
theme continues in secularized form today. In some cases, notably in the Americas and Africa, 
where Christianity has spread the most, there were even discussions about whether the native 
peoples were humans and therefore whether they could receive the Christian message.  
After the Reformation, ideas specific to Protestantism, for example the split between the 
temporal and secular public sphere and the private realm of the conscience and religion, were 
                                                             
30 Ibid.  
31 Balagangadhara, The Heathen, supra note 17 at 329-31.  
32 Balagangadhara, The Heathen, supra note 17 at 331.  
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also brought to Asia. The Reformation had set one Christian movement against another, with 
Protestants claiming that Catholics (and other Protestants) were idolatrous, setting off a chain 
reaction that continues today. As De Roover explains, the chief problem the Protestants 
identified with Catholicism, and with other Protestants, was the presence of idolatry within their 
practices, while the realm of the ‘secular’ was conceptualized as containing the set of sanitized 
practices to which they were indifferent.33 The Enlightenment pushed this process further, with 
the state ideally becoming secular, thus not tied to any religion, while assuring freedom of 
religion and conscience. This phase of secularization was a consequence of, and implicitly 
carried forward, Protestant critiques in so far as they required a secular state as a way of 
guaranteeing that no man-made accretions should influence true worship. Otherwise it would 
amount to idolatry.34 
The building blocks and “intelligibility conditions”35 of Enlightenment ethics, grounded as they 
are on a Christian anthropological framework, have since receded into the background within 
Western jurisdictions to the extent that the link of modern law to religion is often denied, the 
separation between law and religion is seen as incomplete, or such separation is criticized. As 
Balagangadhara points out:  
the lines of distinction between the ‘religious’ and the ‘secular’ spheres are drawn within 
a religion. Historically speaking, this demarcation is the work of Christian theology and 
                                                             
33 Jakob De Roover, “Secular Law and the Realm of False Religion” in Winnifred Fallers Sullivan, Robert A. Yelle 
& Mateo Tausig-Rubbo, eds, After Secular Law (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011) 43.  
34 Such a claim was implicit in the famous Lautsi case (European Court of Human Rights, Case of Lautsi and Others 
v. Italy, Application no. 30814/06, judgment of 18 March 2011), where an atheist Italian parent demanded that the 
crucifixes displayed in all classrooms of the state school her children attended be removed.  
35 Jakob De Roover, Sarah Claerhout & S.N. Balagangadhara, “Liberal Political Theory and the Cultural Migration 
of Ideas: The Case of Secularism in India” (2011) 39 Political Theory 571 at 583. 
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our political theories are Christian theologies in disguise. The enlightenment thinkers 
repeated this Protestant story and this has become our ‘secularism’.36 
This is part of the process which Balagangadhara identifies as ‘secularization’, which is one of 
two ways (the other being conversion) in which Christian theological ideas spread and become 
universalized. Secularization can therefore be seen as the extension of specific clusters of 
Christian ideas into the general or common place conceptual framework of a society, functioning 
as (topoi) which are either heuristic tools for the development of theories or components of such 
theories.37  As those topoi spread, they lose their ostensibly Christian character, and mix in 
various ways to assume their specific characteristics. Importantly, Christian commonplace ideas 
are also extended to other societies according to what is assumed to be a universal framework. 
While there may be a number of agencies for effecting secularization in this manner, legal 
transplants appear to be a key tool for generalizing Christian topoi in a secular guise. While 
modern Westerners have been losing their ability to relate contemporary secularized frameworks 
to their theological background, to Asians they have made even less sense, even though many 
Asians have taken over the Western description of the Asian cultures. Let us turn to the 
processes which were set in motion once religion was found or ‘created’ in Asian contexts. 
 
Japan 
Chiba draws our attention to the fact that, in its long history, Japan had extensive contacts and 
legal transplantation experiences, especially with Korea and China.38 However, the question of 
                                                             
36 Balagangadhara, “Orientalism” supra note 29 at 143. 
37 De Roover et al, “Liberal Political Theory” supra note 35.  
38 Chiba, “Other Phases”, supra note 3 at 89-94. 
Page 15 of 26
Asian Journal of Comparative Law
Asian Journal of Comparative Law
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Review Only
16 
 
religion did not arise until contact was made with the West. The introduction of Catholic 
Christianity to Japan in the 16th century does not appear to have led to major legal reforms, 
although Catholicism was prohibited by the 17th century. It did however give rise to the Japanese 
word for ‘religion’, shukyo, which is said to derive from the Chinese word, tsung-chiao, now 
often translated as ‘the principles and teachings of Buddhism’. Otherwise, as Isomae observes, 
“In the Tokugawa period, however, Christianity was equated with Catholicism, which tended to 
be neglected by Japanese scholars in the modern era due to its ritualistic character.” 39 
Conversely, this indicates that they were not interested in doctrinal foundations for practices as 
the Christian themselves were. It underwrites Balagangadhara’s observation that Asians cannot 
comprehend the nature of religion and view Christian practices as a tradition among other 
traditions.  
During the Meiji period, and with increased contact with Western countries and the introduction 
of Protestantism in Japan, things began to change. The major controversies regarding religion 
started in the late 19th century when there were several linked developments. Religious studies 
were established as a discipline at Tokyo University and later elsewhere. Several religions came 
to be identified including Buddhism, Shinto and Christianity. The process of anothering had 
been set in train. In a pattern that is reflected well in Japan (and in parallel Indian developments), 
Buddhism, for instance, began to be reconstructed with efforts being made to purge it of its 
“superstitious elements”.40 The Greater Japan Imperial Constitution (Dai Nippon Teikoku Kenpo) 
was promulgated in 1889. Along with the sovereignty of the emperor, it formally established 
                                                             
39  Isomae Jun'ichi, “Deconstructing ‘Japanese Religion’: A Historical Survey” (2005) 32 Japanese Journal of 
Religious Studies 235.  
40 Jason Ānanda Josephson, “When Buddhism became a ‘Religion’: Religion and Superstition in the Writings of 
Inoue Enryō” (2006) 33 Japanese Journal of Religious Studies 143. See further, Isomae, Religious Discourse supra 
note 26 at 98-118.  
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Shinto as the state religion, while a stipulation for freedom of religion was also included. 
Already we see a transformation of the language here. Shinto was now regarded as the state 
religion while the vocabulary of religious freedom simultaneously became important. The 
dissemination of the Imperial Rescript on Education that same year likewise confirmed the 
government’s intent to use Shinto to implement policies of national education, particularly a 
code of national morals.  
Consistent with the splitting of the private and public spheres according to a Western logic, 
however, we find that this also led to a further tension within the Japanese political and legal 
system. As Isomae comments: 
Broadly speaking, the debate over national morality refers to policies by the government 
and conservative elements to enlighten the people through moral instruction.... It was 
intended to coincide with the provision for religious freedom, with religious choice to be 
entrusted to each individual. But as policies of national education began to be seen as at 
odds with the constitutional guarantee of religious freedom, its proponents shifted the 
rhetoric of their argument to the need for moral instruction. During this time, Shinto 
gradually split into two camps: Religious Shinto, which followed denominational 
teachings, and Shrine Shinto, which, in addition to reverence for the portrait of the 
emperor, came to emphasize reverence for shrines as a moral obligation of the people in 
their loyalty to the Imperial system. As may be expected, there were naturally those who 
voiced misgivings that reverence for shrines and the portrait of the emperor constituted a 
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form of religious conduct which conflicted with the beliefs of the individual and 
encroached upon religious freedom.41  
The main lines of secularization were therefore becoming clear by the early years of the 20th 
century. On the one hand, the split between religious Shinto and shrine Shinto was an attempt in 
Japan to correspond to the religion (private) - secular (state) divide. The problem remained, 
however, that the association of Shinto with formal state activity, for example through shrines 
and through education, was liable to be attacked on grounds of freedom of religion.42 On the 
other hand, there was also a feeling that Shinto was in need of protection against Christianity and 
Buddhism given that Shinto had been reduced to a ‘folk religion’ and this became an ingredient 
feeding the nationalist sentiment that Japanese culture was under assault. Events subsequently 
went out of control with the rise of militarism and the onset of the long Asian war. Since the 
Second World War, state Shinto has become associated with nationalism and sections of 
Japanese society take a position against state support of it. However, officials and organs of the 
state have since often supported Shinto ceremonies such as the commemoration of dead soldiers 
and seasonal rituals, demonstrating what Chiba had noted about the persistence of indigenous 
legal postulates in Japan.43  
This more or less open support for Shinto co-exists with tensions created within the legal system 
against support for it. After the Second World War, the American occupation authorities issued 
an order for the dismantling of state Shinto. The Japanese Constitution enshrined in Article 20 
                                                             
41 Isomae Jun'ichi, “The Discursive Position of Religious Studies in Japan: Masaharu Anesaki and the Origins of 
Religious Studies” (2002) 14 Method & Theory in the Study of Religion 21 at 29. 
42 Ibid, especially at 28-30. 
43 See, for example, Masaji Chiba, “Japan” in Poh-Ling Tan, ed, Asian Legal Systems: Law, Society and Pluralism 
in East Asia (Sydney et al: Butterworths, 1997) 82.  
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the freedom of religion, a prohibition upon the state conferring any privileges on any religious 
organization, a prohibition on compelling participation in religious acts, celebration, rite, or 
practice, and a prohibition on the state taking part in religious education or any other religious 
activity. It looks as though the model for this is the American ‘wall of separation’ between 
religion and the state. The vocabulary of freedom of religion, religious neutrality of the state, the 
secular nature of the state, and even the separation of Church and state are a constant feature of 
Japanese court judgements either upholding or rejecting challenges to state actions in support of 
‘religion’. These invariably involve ceremonies associated with Shinto, such as breaking the 
ground prior to the construction of a building, enshrinement of a member of the self-defence 
forces in a Gokuku (guardian of the state) shrine, and rituals at the Yasukuni shrines of the war 
dead.44 
What is remarkable for the purposes of the present article is not whether judges either support or 
reject claims against state involvement in Shinto ceremonies, but rather the confidence with 
which they use the kind of language referred to above, which is embedded within a Protestant 
framework, for understanding Japanese traditions. It raises questions about how such language 
makes sense to Japanese judges themselves, to officials, or to Japanese people who operate out 
of a cognitive framework of a completely different order; about how it relates to their experience 
of the world; and about how such a transplanted framework can be said to have been successfully 
absorbed into the Japanese legal order and society. Isomae draws attention to the fact that native 
elites as intellectuals and religious studies scholars have continued to act as the bearers of a 
conceptual discourse that was under the direct influence of Western society. Beyond grasping the 
                                                             
44 Kenneth L. Port & Gerald Paul McAlinn, Comparative law: Law and the Legal Process in Japan (Durham, N.C.: 
Carolina Academic Press, 2003) at 283-303.  
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cultural gap between Japan and the Western world Isomae argues that, “One is also obliged to 
consider the dynamics of power internal to Japan that have involved the cultural hegemony of 
native elites, who are oriented towards the conceptual world of the West, over the general 
populace who remained outside the bounds of that world.”45 Thus, taking very seriously Chiba’s 
claim that the fate of legal transplants is conditioned by the nature of the indigenous identity 
postulate of a socio-legal entity, we need to research more clearly how a framework developed 
within a culture that has religion is changed and distorted, and creates the potential for conflict, 
when it enters into an Asian cultural context where there is no religion.   
 
India 
European contact with India gave rise to several phases in the accumulation of knowledge and 
the construction of Indian realities in the experience of the West.46 Indians came to be regarded 
as ignorant, idolatrous, immoral, heathen devil worshippers held in their sorry state by wily 
priests, the Brahmins.47  Over time, several different ‘religions’ were constructed: Hinduism, 
Buddhism, Jainism and Sikhism and, by analogy with the Reformation critiques by Protestants of 
Catholicism, all of them, except Hinduism, were cast as protest or reform movements against the 
domination by Brahmins. As Oberoi has noted, new boundaries were being created.48 Thus the 
                                                             
45 Isomae, Religious Discourse supra note 26 at 21. 
46 See, in detail, Balagangadhara, The Heathen, supra note 17, especially at 65-140. 
47 See also, G. A. Oddie, Imagined Hinduism: British Protestant Missionary Constructions of Hinduism, 1793-1900 
(New Delhi: SAGE Publications, 2006); R. Gelders & S. N. Balagangadhara, “Rethinking Orientalism: Colonialism 
and the Study of Indian Traditions” (2011) 51 History of Religions 101. 
48 Harjot Oberoi, The Construction of Religious Boundaries: Culture, Identity and Diversity in the Sikh Tradition 
(Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1995). See also Roger Ballard, “Panth, Kismet, Dharm te Quam: Continuity and 
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work of converting Indian traditions into a series of ‘religions’ was underway, once more 
instantiating the process of anothering. 
As De Roover and Balagangadhara have explained, British legal recognition followed the 
understanding that the rulers should not intervene in the affairs of the conscience of their Indian 
subjects.49 The British were reading Indian society according to their own understanding of state-
religion relations and, specifically, their respect for indigenous legal traditions followed the 
requirements of liberal toleration originating in the Protestant Reformation. The legal rules of the 
populace were to be found in textual sources and defence of indigenous mores, for example the 
practice of sati, also came to be based on the textual origin of the practices. This way of acting 
evidently mirrored the Christian understanding, privileging the sacred text as the source of the 
beliefs motivating practices.50 It was thus that the ‘secular’ state in India emerged in the early 
modern period setting the basic contours of the debate on non-interference in the personal laws 
of Indians that continued well into the post-colonial period. The recourse to textual sources for 
the ascertainment of indigenous laws was supplemented by consulting experts in the shastra, a 
practice that came to be abandoned, and replaced by forcing Hindu law into the framework of the 
common law. Portions of it were reformed by statute on the ground that certain practices, such as 
child marriage, needed to be rooted out, and this was often championed by Indians working in 
the colonial legal system.  
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
Change in Four Dimensions of Punjabi Religion” in Pritam Singh & Shinder S. Thandi, eds, Globalisation and the 
Region: Explorations in Punjabi Identity (Coventry: Association for Punjab Studies, 1996) 7. 
49 Jakob De Roover & S.N. Balagangadhara, “Liberty, Tyranny and the Will of God: The Principle of Toleration in 
Early Modern Europe and Colonial India” (2009) 30 History of Political Thought 111. 
50 The textual emphasis is observed repeatedly as integral to the rise of Orientalism by Edward Said, Orientalism 
(New York: Pantheon Books, 1978). 
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However, as De Roover observes, the idea of purifying Hindu law of its man-made accretions 
never went away.51 De Roover shows that although the language of ‘false religion’ and ‘idolatry’ 
was no longer significantly invoked by agents of the secular state from the 19th century, the idea 
remained implicit in the reforms by the secular colonial Indian state in that it was held that the 
‘pure’ elements of Hindu law should be distilled and observed, in so doing undermining the 
diversity of Indian traditions. Repeated attempts were made to write codes reflecting a 
distillation of Hindu law in this way, while subjection to the English paradigm of judge-made 
law did its own work in undermining customs.52 As De Roover notes, “The conceptual realm of 
false religion had been secularized in the sense that it became an implicit criterion presented as 
though it were internal to Hindu religion” (italics in original).53 
It appears as though the idea of doing away with Indian traditions was revivified in the early 
post-colonial era when a major attempt at reforms to the Hindu personal law was made. 
Rhetorically, at least, the principle that there would be no interference in the personal law of a 
community without a demand from that community was observed. That was until the 1930s 
when changes were made to Muslim law on the basis of demands by ulema, who portrayed 
themselves as representing the Muslim community, after a sustained campaign for asserting the 
primacy of Islamic law over custom among Muslims.54 Rina Verma Williams, who develops a 
fascinating account of the continuity between the colonial and post-colonial periods in Indian 
state policy regarding personal law, says that:  
                                                             
51 Jakob De Roover, “Secular Law” supra note 33 at 51-6.  
52 Werner F. Menski, Hindu Law: Beyond Tradition and Modernity (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2003) at 156-
208.  
53 Jakob De Roover, “Secular Law” supra note 33 at 55. 
54 Rina Verma Williams, Postcolonial Politics and Personal Laws: Colonial Legal Legacies and the Indian State 
(New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2006) at 83-8.  
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The government would claim to be following community opinion but in reality few 
systematic attempts were made to determine what that opinion might actually be. Where 
there was evidence of community opinion, it was often divided and inconclusive. 
Ultimately, government leaders relied on the views of a faction of community leaders 
(religious and/or political) that supported the position the government advocated.55   
Statutory reforms of Hindu law were championed already prior to the independence but were 
pushed to the fore in its aftermath by the reformist Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, and B. R. 
Ambedkar, the first Law Minister, who had already successfully included Article 44 as a 
Directive Principle looking to a future Uniform Civil Code. Nehru assured Muslim 
spokespersons that, “personal law is part of religion. It is obvious that no change can be imposed 
from the top”.56 The reform to Hindu law resulted in four pieces of legislation referred to as the 
“Hindu Code Bill” (the language is itself reminiscent of the earlier colonial debates on 
codification) reforming various aspects of Hindu law. The legislation was applied to those who 
are Hindus “by religion”, but included Buddhists, Jains and Sikhs. It was resisted by the Hindu 
Mahasabha and some prominent members of the ruling Congress party, including the President, 
Rajendra Prasad, and Vallabhai Patel, and concessions were demanded, especially as to the 
recognition of custom, while the Hindu joint family system fell out of the scope of the 
legislation.57  
The Hindu legislation of the 1950s can be interpreted in a number of ways: one may conclude 
that it was a messy compromise not achieving much in the end; that it left out of its scope much 
of relevance; and it was not in fact the first step toward the achievement of the Uniform Civil 
                                                             
55 Ibid at 10.  
56 Quoted in ibid at 102.  
57 Ibid at 109-13.  
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Code because, significantly, Muslim personal law has remained largely out of reach of 
legislative change.58 There is, however, another way to look at the matter. The proponents of the 
1950s reform often justified it by saying that they merely continued what the British had initiated 
and questioned why there should be an objection now that an ‘indigenous’ government was 
doing the same work. Advocates for reform, notably Nehru, were also deeply impressed by the 
idea of a secular state, seeing religion as superstitious dogma responsible for conflict. The ideal 
was that a Uniform Civil Code of India should show no trace of religion, and the first candidates 
for reform should be the Hindus. Menski, noting the lack of any desire for general reform of the 
legal system inherited from the colonial state, sums up the background thinking and the results:   
The approach to Hindu personal law appeared to be quite different, however, as the 
modernizing post-colonial state developed an appetite and ambition for personal law 
reform. The ambition had been nurtured during the final decades of British rule, partly as 
a result of the British forms of ‘civilizing mission’ and its perceived fruits in the form of 
social reform movements. Almost by definition, the modernization of Hindu law in India 
was perceived as a historical opportunity for removing ‘tradition’, a chance to wipe out 
the remaining vestiges of traditional norms in the Hindu personal law as they had 
developed and sheltered under Anglo-Hindu law. It was a revolution, but it remained by 
its nature incomplete. In reality, despite all the hype, the reformed law was no more than 
a half-way house in the ongoing legal process of harmonizing law and society.59 
As Menski observes here, the 1950s reforms to Hindu law were a continuation of the civilizing 
mission started by the British and founded on hostility to tradition. According to the reading of 
                                                             
58 Ibid at 113-120.  
59 Menski, Hindu Law supra note 52 at 211.  
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developments proffered here, it appears as though the task, initiated by the colonial masters with 
their Protestant background, of removing idolatrous practices of a false religion, had been taken 
over by the post-colonial state. However incomplete this process may have been, as Menski 
notes throughout his major work, 60  the continuous problematization has made a 
conceptualization of Hindu law, or Indian traditional laws in general, as centrally composed of 
diverse ancestral practices, ever more difficult to articulate. Consequently, they are constantly 
pushed into the ‘unofficial’ sphere, as Chiba might say, where they continue to exercise their 
pull.  
 
Concluding thoughts 
We can return to think again about Chiba’s observation that the preservation of a people’s 
cultural identity in law, in the face of transplanted law from foreign countries, is conditioned by 
their identity postulate of indigenous law. In light of this hypothesis how should we evaluate 
what has occurred to Japanese and Indian people when they have absorbed a predominantly 
Protestant Christian framework of law? In the case of the absorption of the Western norm of 
religion and the secular, and its linked concepts such as religious freedom, the separation of 
religion and state, etc. the evidence indicates that the state systems in Japan and India have come 
to assume an alien, religious identity, have transformed their understanding of their own people, 
and they have attempted to reform the law of their people in accordance with this alien 
framework of secularization. In the process, the people have become just another group of 
religious people and they now experience ‘religious’ nationalism, religious conflict, and battles 
for their religious rights. Their experience has come to be distorted and occluded in part through 
                                                             
60 Ibid.   
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the agency of their official legal systems. Balagangadhara speaks of ‘colonial consciousness’ to 
refer to the absorption of experience occluding structures of religion with respect to Indian 
culture.61 Should we apply the same reading to the Japanese case even though there is no direct 
colonial relationship between Japan and the West? What is the role of violence here? Where does 
it leave Chiba’s hypothesis that the identity postulate of indigenous law is the mechanism of 
retention of a people’s cultural identity? What implications do the findings presented here have 
for steering a future course of action for the study of Asian legal systems?  
 
                                                             
61 S.N. Balagangadhara, “Secularism as the Harbinger of Religious Violence in India: Hybridisation, Hindutva and 
Post-Coloniality’ in D. Schirmer, G. Saalmann, & C. Kessler, eds, Hybridising East and West: Tales beyond 
Westernisation (Berlin, LIT Verlag, 2006) 145; S.N. Balagangadhara, Reconceptualizing India Studies (New Delhi: 
Oxford University Press, 2012). 
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